TIBETANS AND MUSLIMS IN NORTHWEST CHINA: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF A COMPLEX HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP

Bianca Horlemann (Research Associate, Humboldt University Berlin)

ABSTRACT
In the past and today, Tibetan-Muslim relations in Qinghai and Gansu are often associated with violent conflicts sparked by religious differences or 'interethnic hatred'. A more nuanced study of the history of Tibetan-Muslim relations, however, reveals complexity as well as considerable local difference with regard to how and when contacts were established, maintained, and broken off. Tibetan-Muslim encounters were manifold and varied, including interethnic marriages, close business relations, political alliances, and armed conflicts. To illustrate this wide range of encounters, examples chosen for this paper, i.e., the relations between Amdo Tibetans and the Muslim Baoan nationality, the Muslim Ma warlords, and the Chinese xiejia institution, span different eras and localities. This study suggests that Tibetan-Muslim relations were predominantly shaped by socio-economic and political factors rather than by religious differences or 'interethnic hatred' as is often assumed.

KEYWORDS
Baoan, Golok/ Mgo log, Ma warlords, Muslim, Qinghai, Tibetan, xiejia
INTRODUCTION

I introduce the complex situation of Tibetan-Muslim relations in northwest China by providing a broad analysis of the three examples chosen for this paper. I wish to point out at the beginning that I frequently use and contrast the terms 'Muslims' and 'Tibetans', although the first term denotes ethnically and culturally diverse groups who adhere to Islam while 'Tibetans' refers to a culturally and ethnically defined group. I have often opted for 'Muslims' as a very general, collective term for different ethnicities in order to avoid repetitive enumerations of ethnic names that are not commonly known and not automatically associated with Islam in northwest China. Furthermore, I have restricted this study to Tibetans and do not deal with 'Buddhists' (although the great majority of Tibetans believe in Buddhism) as opposed to 'Muslims', since I specifically argue in this paper that religious aspects play only a minor role in Muslim-Tibetan relations. Nor do I treat in detail other Buddhist adherents in northwest China such as the Mongols, Yugurs, and Chinese with the exception of the Monguor in relation to the Baoan.

The last few years have seen frequent reports of violent conflicts between Tibetans and Muslims. Social turbulence in March 2008 in Tibetan areas of China included attacks on mosques, Muslim shops, and restaurants (Los Angeles Times 23 June 2008), thus reminding observers of the centuries-old presence of Muslims in overwhelmingly Buddhist Tibet. Such conflicts led to Tibetan boycott movements against Muslim shops and restaurants, expulsion of Muslim families from Tibetan villages, and caused casualties on both sides. At times, seemingly trivial incidents ignited violent reactions,

---

1 This revised version of a German language article (Horlemann 2009) reflects initial results of ongoing research generously supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation. I thank the AHP editors, Marie-Paule Hille, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Remaining mistakes are entirely my own.

2 Chinese is transcribed in pinyin and Tibetan in Wylie. Exceptions are made for terms commonly known in westernized forms, e.g., lama for bla ma and such Tibetan personal names as Jamyang Shaypa ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa).

3 'Tibet' and 'Tibetan' as used here mainly refer to cultural Tibet in modern China, i.e., to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and culturally Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces in China.
e.g., the quarrel between young Tibetans and Muslims over a game of billiards, the allegedly overpriced sale of a balloon to a Tibetan child by a Muslim vendor, or rumors about Muslim restaurant owners mixing ashes of deceased Muslims into food in order to convert Tibetan customers to Islam (Los Angeles Times 23 June 2008; World Tibet News 25 February 2008, Fischer 2008a:168, 171-181, and 2005:16-22).

Figure 1. Gansu and Eastern Qinghai. Map draft: B Horlemann, map maker: A Gruschke.

While central Tibet is home to few Muslims and non-Tibetans, the population of southern Gansu and eastern Qinghai is ethnically complex. According to Chinese official data based on the 2000 census,
non-Tibetans living in the TAR account for less than ten percent of the population (Fischer 2008b:631-662). Although Han Chinese constitute the ethnic majority in Gansu Province (approximately ninety-one percent of the population), the local ethnic fabric is quite different. In Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, for example, 780,000 Han Chinese live with 1.05 million people of other ethnicities, most of whom are Muslims. In neighboring Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture there are about 270,000 Han Chinese compared to about 370,000 members of other ethnicities, mostly Tibetans (Gansu nianjian 2001:31, 187, 260). In Qinghai Province the population is fifty-four percent Han Chinese, twenty-two percent Tibetan, and sixteen percent Hui. However, if one takes, for example, the ethnic minority of the Muslim Salar who only account for about two percent of the overall population of Qinghai, in Xunhua Salar Autonomous County, southeast of the provincial capital Xining, the roughly 71,000 Salar constitute a clear ethnic majority compared to only 7,000 Han Chinese, 26,000 Tibetans and 8,000 Hui living in the same county (Qinghai tongji nianjian 2001:6-7, 43).

It is also important to provide some background on the ethnic groups that are central to this paper. The ten million Hui in China are purported to be descendants of Arabian and Persian merchants who came to Chinese seaports to trade from the seventh century onwards and eventually founded new families with Chinese wives. Due to the considerable admixture with Han Chinese, these Muslim merchants assimilated linguistically and culturally to their new homeland with the exception of their religious beliefs. Consequently, commitment to Islam has remained the main marker of the Hui minority while culturally and linguistically they are as diverse as the local Chinese communities in which they live (Gladney 1996:26-36).

The Salar are a Turkic-speaking Muslim minority presently numbering about 100,000 people. They live mostly in the Qinghai-Gansu border region on both sides of the Yellow River, primarily in Xunhua County and Hualong Hui Autonomous County of Qinghai, and the adjacent Jishishan Baoan, Dongxiang, and Salar Autonomous County of Gansu.
The Monguor (Tu) include the Monguor of Tongren County, Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Huzhu Tu Autonomous County, and Minhe Hui and Tu Autonomous County all in Qinghai and Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County in Gansu. They speak mutually unintelligible Monguor dialects/ languages, dress differently, and have acculturated differently according to the dominant ethnic groups in their home areas. A common denominator is adherence to Tibetan Buddhism, while other speakers of Mongolic languages who are Muslims, such as the Dongxiang and the Baoan, are classified under specific ethnonyms.5

Baoan designates a Mongolic dialect as well as a people. They are also known as Bonan, Baonan, Paoan, and Paongan (Fried 2010:2). The Dongxiang, sometimes called Sarts, are a Mongol-speaking Muslim minority presently numbering about 250,000. They live in remote areas east of Hezhou/ Linxia, in Jishishan County and in Dongxiang Autonomous County.

4 Also Mangghuer and Mongghul.
5 For an illuminating study on the self-perception of the Tongren Monguor who often refer to themselves as 'Tibetans', and on the Tongren Baoan dialect/ language see Fried (2009, 2010).
In addition to these groups, there is also a steadily increasing number of Han Chinese. I also wish to stress that during their long history as close neighbors, tensions among these various ethnicities existed in almost all possible constellations; they were not restricted exclusively to the relationship between Tibetans and Muslims.

With regard to Gansu and Qinghai, there are many examples of intra-ethnic conflicts, such as Tibetan inter-tribal conflicts, as well as intra-religious conflicts, e.g., conflicts between different Tibetan monasteries or between Muslim sects. Especially the conflicts between different Muslim sects often turned into interethnic conflicts, i.e., usually into Han-Hui conflicts. In fact, owing to the great diversity of Muslim schools of thought across the various ethnic groups mentioned above, the Muslim population of Gansu and Qinghai is much more heterogeneous than usually anticipated, though they all adhere to Sunni Islam. Apart from the widespread Gedimu tradition, many Qinghai and Gansu Muslims follow one of the main Sufi orders, i.e., the Naqshbandiyya (subdivided into Khufiyya and Jahriyya), the Qadariyya, and the Kubrawiyya, which became popular in China beginning in the seventeenth century. In contrast to the Gedimu tradition, many Sufi orders have established strong socio-economic and politico-religious structures based on the deep veneration of their religious leaders, the shaykhs, as well as the possibility of passing on the shaykh position from father to son or to a close disciple, and on the often substantial mobile and immobile donations of followers to their respective shaykh. This has led to the accumulation of great riches by several Sufi orders. Sects based on a specific line of Sufi tradition connected with a certain shaykh are called menhuan in Chinese and are independent of each other.

Menhuan may also compete with each other regarding questions of correct religious practices and economic and politico-religious influence within the Muslim communities (Gladney 1996:36-59, Aubin 1989:212, 363, and Dillon 1999:95-100, 113-114). During the eighteenth century, these rivalries led to a division of the Sufi Naqshbandiyya communities into adherents of the so-called New School (xinjiao/ Jahriyya) represented by Ma Mingxin's (1719-1781) teachings and the Old School (laojiao/ Khufiyya) represented by Ma Laichi's (1673-1753) teachings. The nineteenth century witnessed a
further splintering into a New New School (xinxinjiao/ Yihewani) led by Ma Wanfu/ Ma Guoyuan (1849-1934) (Dillon 1999:100-103 and Gladney 1996:55-56). Theological differences within Islam in northwest China not only repeatedly sparked violent conflicts within the Muslim communities, but also often affected Muslim relations with Chinese local authorities after one Muslim party had appealed to Chinese judicial institutions to intervene.\(^6\) Tibetans, however, usually only became involved when Chinese authorities mustered Tibetan military support in order to subdue Muslim unrest after unsuccessful Chinese intervention.\(^7\)

Apart from these intra-religious Islamic disputes that often grew into interethnic, mostly Han-Hui, conflicts, numerous direct Tibetan-Muslim confrontations occurred as well. In China, the causes of interethnic conflicts were frequently attributed to divergent religious beliefs and 'interethnic hatred' (minzu chouhen) or 'interethnic contradictions' (minzu maodun). This viewpoint is often shared by Tibetans and Muslims alike, and is probably also the predominant opinion among Westerners today and in the past. In post-1950 China and in accordance with the communist perspective, the former feudal system was usually singled out as the main cause of dissent between ethnic groups.\(^8\)

However, the social economist Fischer, who has studied Tibetan-Muslim conflicts after the introduction of the Open Door Policy in China in the 1980s, argues that the frequently recurrent conflicts of the last two decades were mainly caused by a continuously progressing socio-economic marginalization of Tibetans (Fischer 2008a:159-192, 2008b:631-662, 2005:1-27, and 2004:1-35). Modern Chinese scholars such as Min (2006:542) and Ma (2006:316-

\(^6\) Lipman, who studies the history of Muslim-Han relations, suggests that the strife for dominance of different Sufi orders was the main instigator of interethnic conflict in eighteenth-nineteenth century northwest China (see Lipman 1990:65-86, 1980, and 1984:285-316).

\(^7\) For an example, see the Baoan section further below.

23) also stress the importance of economic issues for forming Muslim-Tibetan relations in the context of their studies in modern Gannan Prefecture and Xunhua County, respectively.

My preliminary studies on the history of Tibetan-Muslim interactions in Gansu and Qinghai between 1862 and 1949 also mainly point towards socio-economic and political causes for interethnic conflicts and indicate that divergent religious beliefs or ethno-cultural differences primarily reinforced already existing political and economic Muslim-Tibetan conflicts. Though religious issues certainly played a major role in specific conflicts, this did not occur as often as commonly assumed. I therefore argue that future research should focus more on competing political and economic interests such as Muslim-Tibetan disputes over land, water, and pasture rights as potential causes for interethnic conflicts.⁹

![Figure 3. Scene in Reb gong/ Tongren County, 1998. Photo B Horlemann.](image)

⁹ Water rights issues continue to be of importance for modern Xunhua County (see Ma 2006:321).
The lack of academic exploration of land disputes in Tibetan-Muslim relations can perhaps be explained in part by the strength of certain ethnic stereotypes. The common stereotype of Muslims as extremely successful and cunning merchants and service providers suggests that Muslim economic activities mainly focus on commerce and the service sector whereas, in fact, the majority of Muslims depend on farming and animal husbandry and mostly engage in commerce as a side business. In the late 1980s, for example, sixty percent of the Hui in China worked in the agricultural sector while ninety percent of Baoan, Dongxiang, and Salar earned their living as farmers (Gladney 1996:30-32). A very similar picture for the 1930s is found in Ekvall (1939:14-17) and Zhang (Minguo era, 110).

At the same time, we should keep in mind that for extended periods of time Tibetans and Muslims in Gansu and Qinghai lived peacefully side-by-side and often entertained close social and economic contacts. Furthermore, both groups influenced each other culturally, linguistically and religiously, whereby the Muslims apparently borrowed more from the Tibetans than vice versa.10

For this paper I have chosen to focus on interactions of Amdo Tibetans with the Muslim Baoan, the Muslim Ma warlords, and the xiejia institution because they not only provide a cross-section through different eras and localities, but represent distinct examples that have been little studied in western literature.

THE BAOAN MUSLIMS AND THEIR FORMER TIBETAN NEIGHBORS

A historical example illustrative of the many different layers of Muslim-Tibetan relations is the migration of the small (16,000) Muslim Baoan minority. The ethnogenesis of this minority is complicated and much debated. For reasons stated below, the Baoan

---

10 See, for example, references to the formerly not unusual mixed marriages between Muslim men and Tibetan women in d'Ollone (1911:234-235), Cwik (1952:242-244), Griebenow (1936:128), Ekvall (1939:62), and Ma (2006:287-288). The latter also describes how certain Tibetan wedding customs are still practised in Salar marriages up to the present (Ma 2006). With regard to religious borrowings see, for example, d'Ollone (1911), Slobodnik (2008), Andrew (1921:65, 108), and Hayward (1934:76-77).
of Jishishan County in Gansu are a splinter group of a people living in the Reb gong (Tongren) area of Qinghai. The Tongren Baoan who are officially classified as Monguor (Tu), and are thus also referred to as Tongren Tu, are Buddhists and considerably Tibetanized, often speaking Tibetan as their first or second language. In contrast, the Baoan living in Jishishan are Muslims and speak Chinese as their second language. Though the Baoan dialects spoken by these two groups differ, they are still mutually intelligible, whereas certain other Mongolic Tu languages in Qinghai and Gansu are not (Fried 2010:2-3, 6-11; Gao 1987:349; and Lian 2006:368).

According to one theory, the Baoan, who have neither ethnonyms for themselves nor glottonym for their language, are the descendants of the Tuyuhun, who migrated from Manchuria to the Qinghai area as early as the third century AD. A more widely accepted theory considers the Baoan to be descendants of Muslim Mongols or Central Asian Turks who in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries followed the Mongol army during their military campaigns to northwest China and were later settled as military colonists close to the Baoan fortification near modern Reb gong/ Tongren. Having lived in the Baoan area for many centuries, this place name eventually became the ethnonyms of the speakers of that specific Mongolic dialect. Supposedly, the Baoan mixed with the local population who were mainly Tibetans, but also included Hui and Han residents as well as other Monguor groups. Despite the strong Tibetan cultural influences most Baoan retained their own language and Muslim belief. The majority of the Baoan lived as farmers and/or herders, apparently often on land leased from Tibetan monasteries or from other major landlords such as the local tusi.

Since the Baoan lack a script of their own and Chinese sources provide only fragmentary accounts, we mainly rely on oral traditions with regard to their history.\(^\text{14}\) Most sources agree that out-migration from the Baoan area in Reb gong began in the mid-nineteenth century due to serious disputes with the local Tibetans and the Buddhist Monguor/ Tongren Tu. However, accounts differ with regard to the causes for the conflicts.

Some versions claim that the violence started after Tibetan youth of the Duosaidong Tribe\(^\text{15}\) tricked Muslim Baoan into eating pork, deliberately disregarding the Muslim taboo on pork consumption. Other versions blame disputes about irrigation rights for causing the conflicts.\(^\text{16}\) One account specifically relates how the Baoan were originally of Tibetan ethnicity and firm believers in Buddhism. However, after they had converted to Islam, they were socially and economically marginalized by the Buddhist clergy of Rong bo Monastery in Reb gong as well as by certain local tribal chieftains.\(^\text{17}\) Especially during the Xianfeng era (1851-1862), Rong bo Monastery is supposed to have used irrigation rights as a means to pressure the Baoan to (re)convert to Buddhism, allegedly even encouraging the killing of Baoan unwilling to convert.\(^\text{18}\) After a series of attacks during the mid to late nineteenth century by the Tibetan Maba Tribe (of which the Duosaidong Tribe constituted a sub-tribe) as well as by allied Buddhist Monguor, the majority of the Muslim Baoan fled east, first towards Xunhua and later to Jishishan.

\(^\text{14}\) Many of the oral traditions have been included in internal Chinese reports created during the ethnic identification campaign of the 1950s (see Ding 1999:17-21 and Ma 2001:214-270 for extracts).

\(^\text{15}\) I borrowed the terms 'tribe', 'sub-tribe', and 'clan' from my sources for convenience since the on-going academic discussion of these terms is not directly relevant to this paper.

\(^\text{16}\) See Baoanzu jianshi (1984:24-25, 29), Jishishan baoanzu dongxiangzu salazu zizhixian gaikuang (1986:31), and Ma (2001:3).

\(^\text{17}\) See Yang (1988:554-555 fn. 3(4)).

\(^\text{18}\) See Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zhi (1999:1350) and Yang (1988:555). No source is provided for the alleged appeal to kill those unwilling to convert to Buddhism.
Most Chinese studies attribute these outbursts of violence against the Muslim Baoan by Reb gong Tibetans and Monguor mainly to increased competition for scarce water resources needed for irrigation and further exacerbated by population pressure. In fact, land disputes between Tibetans and Muslim Baoan have remained a recurrent event in Reb gong County into the twenty-first century. However, certain other events deserve further research. For example, in the early to mid-nineteenth century Muslim Salar from the Xunhua area were employed as troops by the Qing administration to quell the rising number of Tibetan-Mongol pasture conflicts when Tibetan tribes from south of the Rma chu/ Huanghe began pressing north into the Mongolian dominated grasslands towards Kokonor. This military engagement of Muslim Salar from neighboring Xunhua was also directed against Tibetan tribes originating from the Reb gong area, which further negatively impacted Tibetan relations with their Muslim Baoan neighbors in the Reb gong area.

Furthermore, the flight of the Muslim Baoan roughly coincided with the various Muslim uprisings in Gansu and Qinghai between 1860 and 1873 and with general anti-Muslim unrest elsewhere in China. It should be noted that Muslim Baoan also participated in revolts directed against the Qing administration, joining Salar and Hui from Xunhua and Hualong. In response, the Qing this time mustered support from Tibetans and Buddhist Monguor against the Muslim threat to Chinese authority (Qing miaozung yi huangdi shilu, juan 109, 2023 and Tongren xianzhi

---

20 Mtsho sngon po/ Qinghai hu. Tibetan attacks on the Kokonor Mongols started in the late eighteenth century and continued to recur until the late 1850s.
21 See Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zhi (1999:1354-1360) and Qing xuanzong cheng huangdi shilu (juan 211, 2530) for the involvement of Tibetan tribes from the Reb gong area and the employment of the Salar. From 1762 onwards, the area of modern Reb gong/ Tongren County was partially under the administration of Xunhua ting. Thus most Tibetan tribes from Reb gong County are designated 'Xunhua tribes' in Chinese sources.
22 Ma (2001:3, 310). Note also the so-called Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan, 1856-1873, the Muslim uprisings in Shaanxi between 1862 and 1873, and the Ya'qub Beg rebellion and rule in Eastern Turkestan/ Xinjiang in the 1860s/1870s.
2001:24), thus further aggravating the already existing interethnic tensions mentioned above. In fact, the Qing administration withdrew its regular troops stationed in the Baoan garrison from 1860 to 1871, in order to reinforce troops elsewhere (Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zhi 1999:987), thereby providing a good opportunity for the Reb gong Tibetans and Monguors to rid themselves of their Muslim Baoan neighbors.

Surprisingly, many of the fleeing Muslim Baoan were protected and assisted by the Tibetan Gling rgyal/ Langjia Tribe, who were one of the twelve major tribes in the Reb gong area and neighbors of the attacking Maba tribe. Even today, the Baoan of Ganhetan and Meipo villages in Gansu call members of the Tibetan Gling rgyal tribe awangcang 'life saving benefactors' or axiang 'maternal uncles' (Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zhi 1999:1351 and Yang 1988:554-556). Well into the twentieth century, Baoan representatives annually brought presents to the Gling rgyal Tribe to thank them for their former protection and assistance. Studies on the relationship of the Baoan to the Gling rgyal Tribe prior to the expulsion of the Baoan from Reb gong are lacking. It would be of value to learn if support offered by the Gling rgyal Tribe had its origin in a special bond with the Baoan or if it was motivated by conflict with the Maba Tribe or Rong bo Monastery and thus followed the principle of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. One source suggests that the Baoan Muslims had previously contributed generously to a newly built temple of the Gling rgyal Tribe, which fostered good relations between the Baoan and their Tibetan neighbors (Ma 2001:229).

Prior to expulsion from the Reb gong area, several Baoan had yielded to the pressure of the Buddhist clergy and converted to Buddhism. Conversion from Islam to Buddhism and vice versa,

23 Chinese officials apparently promised to compensate Tibetan and Monguor support by transferring land of defeated Muslims (Bonin 1910:218).
24 The Baoan were also supported by other Buddhist neighbors such as the Monguor Helongnaka Tribe (Yang 1998:21-23).
25 For the numerous, recurrent Tibetan inter-tribal conflicts in the late nineteenth century Reb gong area see, for example, Yang 2009.
26 See Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zhi (1999:1350). Presently, only a few hundred Baoan are registered in Reb gong/Tongren County; presumably
whether of individuals or even of whole villages, has repeatedly occurred in Qinghai and Gansu.\textsuperscript{27} Although some conversions might have been caused by sincere changes in religious conviction, others were apparently due to pressure or opportunism. For example, according to tradition, twenty-eight former Buddhist Tibetan tribes in what is now Ba yan rong/ Hualong County in Qinghai, allegedly converted to Islam after miracles were performed by the famous eighteenth century Sufi master Ma Laichi.\textsuperscript{28} In fact, several villages in Hualong County are still inhabited by so-called 'Tibetan Muslims' (Bod hu’i/ E hui) today.

**THE MUSLIM MA WARLORDS IN QINGHAI**

The negative image of Muslims in the collective memory of the Tibetans in Qinghai and Gansu today has been considerably shaped by the numerous violent conflicts, which accompanied the rise to power of the Muslim clan of Ma Haiyan (1837-1900?) in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{29} The Ma family originated from a Hui village near

\begin{itemize}
\item many are registered as Tibetan, Monguor, or Hui (see *Tongren xian zhi* 2001:207 and Lian 2006:367). Fried (2010:6) mentions 4,000 Baoan speakers in Tongren County.
\item Accounts of conversion are mostly found in Christian missionary reports. See, for example, Griebenow (1936:128) and Andrew (1921:52-53). For the more frequently occurring conversions of Han Chinese to Islam see Andrew (1921:64-65) and Ekvall (1939:25-28). For individual conversions, see for example, Ma Shou, a former Tibetan Buddhist monk who converted to Islam and became the Tibetan interpreter and trusted assistant of the Muslim warlord Ma Qi (*Huang zhengqing yu wu shi jiamuyang* 1989:9-10).
\item On these so-called 'Tibetan Kargang (Kha sgang/ Kagang/ Kaligang) Muslims' see Rockhill (1894:82-83), Trippner (1961:154-155), Li and Xu (1982:417-426), and Chang (forthcoming).
\item This account is based on Chinese and Tibetan secondary literature on the Ma Warlord era as well as on rarely used western and Chinese sources such as contemporary newspapers and reports by missionaries and western travellers. For the numerous secondary sources see, for example, Chen (2007), Yang (2007), Shi (2006), *Qinghai san ma* (1988), Hunsberger (1978; Chinese translation 1994), *Qinghai lishi jiyao* (1987), Don grub dbang rgyal (1991), 'Gu log dam chos dpal bzang (2000), Hor gtsang 'jigs med (2009), *Huang zhengqing yu wu shi jiamuyang* (1989), *Gcig sgril sa khul gyi tsho* (2001). 
\end{itemize}
Linxia in Gansu, and the sudden rise of some of its members from small merchants and peasants to influential provincial leaders was closely connected with their outstanding military skills and political instincts as is demonstrated by the appointment of Ma Haiyan's son, Ma Qi (1869-1931), as the governor of the newly founded province of Qinghai by the Republican Government of China in 1928. After Ma Qi's death in 1931 his brother, Ma Lin (1873-1945), succeeded him as provincial governor until he was replaced by Ma Qi's son, Ma Bufang (1902-1973) in 1936, when Ma Lin was considered too old and weak to deal with the communists who were approaching Qinghai on their Long March.

In 1916, Ma Qi introduced a rigid modernization program for Qinghai Province and intended to finance it with taxes and fees as well as through the exploitation of timber and other natural resources such as gold and coal, which were mostly located in Tibetan inhabited areas. Since Qinghai contained relatively limited agricultural lands, revenues accrued from agricultural taxes were rather small. Therefore,


Apart from Ma Haiyan's clan there were two other influential Muslim Ma clans in Gansu and Qinghai whose families were originally unrelated. The clan of Ma Zhan'ao was based in the Linxia area and had played a prominent role in the Muslim uprisings of the nineteenth century. After having at first fought against the Qing troops dispatched to quell the rebellions, Ma Zhan'ao later changed sides and was then promoted by the Qing court. The clan of Ma Fuxiang was originally based in Lanzhou, but later also became influential in Ningxia. Ma Fuxiang was a candidate for governor of Gansu in the 1920s, but local Chinese opposed the idea of a Muslim governor. Instead his son, Ma Hongkui, married the daughter of the Lanzhou governor, Lu Hongtao, and Ma Fuxiang then received appointments in Mongolia and Ningxia. In the first decade of the twentieth century both Ma Fuxiang and Ma Haiyan's son, Ma Qi, served as high-ranking officers under Ma Zhan'ao's son, Ma Anliang, in the provincial army of Gansu. However, Ma Fuxiang and Ma Anliang were not on good terms and when Ma Fuxiang was appointed military commander of Xining in 1912, Ma Anliang intervened with the result that Ma Fuxiang was sent to Ningxia and Ma Qi became the military commander of Xining, thus marking his rapid rise to power in Qinghai.

Ma Lin was thus recommended by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek) to go on a hajj to Mecca, which he did from 1937 to 1938. Therefore, Ma Bufang became the de facto ruler of Qinghai already in 1936, and was officially appointed as the new Qinghai governor in 1938.
the Qing Dynasty collected a head tax (*ding yin*) from so-called 'tamed' nomads. Ma Qi changed this tax into a production tax (called *cao tou shui*) in 1916, and subsequently tried to enforce it in all nomadic areas including those of 'untamed' Tibetans. In order to achieve his goals Ma Qi did not hesitate to make use of military force and also skillfully manipulated inter-tribal conflicts and disputes between Tibetan monasteries.\(^{32}\) Between 1917 and the early 1940s, these actions — together with the complicated grid of competing political interests among the Han Chinese, Hui, and Tibetans — ignited numerous armed conflicts between provincial government troops and local Tibetan populations, resulting in thousands of deaths.\(^{33}\) In several instances, these conflicts led to unimaginable cruelty on both sides: sources abound in reports of impaled heads, sliced open bellies, cut-off ears, and so on.

Among these events are Ma Qi's early endeavors to enforce unhindered access to gold deposits in the Amnye Machen Range in the heart of Golok territory, and secure undisturbed travel for military convoys from Xining to Yul shul/ Yushu which had become a contentious issue between Sichuan and Gansu/ Qinghai in 1914. This was followed by attempts to integrate the independent Golok nomads politically and militarily into Qinghai Province and to enforce regular tax payments. The conflict between Ma Qi and the A skyong Gong ma/ Ashenjiang gongma Tribe from Golok is just one such example. After the establishment of a military outpost in Yushu by Ma Qi in 1915, several new military stations were opened along the courier route from Xining to Jekundo\(^{34}\) County seat which skirted the Golok area,\(^{35}\) and the tribes en route from Xining to Jekundo were

---

\(^{32}\) See, for example, Lipman (1980:245-250), *Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou gaikuang* (1984:43-49), and Don grub dbang rgyal (1991:153-173). A study titled *The Mgo log and the Muslim Ma Warlords (dmags shed can Ma’ rgyud)* in A mdo, 1917–1949 was presented by the author at the IATS conference in Vancouver in 2010 and an expanded version is currently being prepared for publication.

\(^{33}\) With regard to the competing political interests see, for example, Lipman (1980, 1984, and 1990) and Lin (2007 and 2006:41-44, 63-65, 94-98, 111-115).

\(^{34}\) Skye dgu mdo/ Yushu.

\(^{35}\) The courier route led from Xining via Lake Gyaring/ Mtsho Skya ring/ Zhalinghu to Jekundo County seat and took about two months to travel,
frequently demanded to provide *ula*(g) (*wula*), i.e., unpaid guides and transport for military caravans. This understandably annoyed the affected tribes. Furthermore, Ma Qi made plans for a major gold mining enterprise at Amnye Machen in 1917 and sent orders to the Gong ma chieftain to allow the mining activities.

Gold mining activities in Amdo, mostly gold washing, had been actively propagated by Ma Qi since at least 1916 in several places in Qinghai and repeatedly led to Tibetan opposition, including attacks on the gold washers (Anonymous 1916b:619 and 1917:17). 

Despite Ma Qi’s orders, the Gong ma tribesmen attacked and killed several of the 200 to 300 gold miners in 1918 because, according to one source, the gold miners had repeatedly looted whereas a short-cut straight through the Golok area was thought to take only about three weeks (see Anonymous 1916a:443).  

---

*Ula*, also written *ulag*, apparently derives from the Mongol *ulaga* or Manchu *ula* (Hauer 1952:953), both of which denote relay stations. In Amdo, *ula* referred to corvée requested from nomads in the form of providing guides and transport animals to officials free of charge.
nearby nomadic camps. Ma Qi was furious but did not retaliate immediately. However, when in late 1918, the newly appointed magistrate of Jekundo and his twenty troops were apparently attacked by Goloks while taking a short-cut through Golok territory on the way from Xining to Jekundo, Ma Qi reacted by dispatching 1,000 troops on a punitive expedition.37

37 Anonymous 1919a:332.
In August 1920 Ma Qi sent an especially large caravan with provisions from Xining to Yushu that was attacked by about 1,000 Gong ma tribesmen near the Bayankala Mountains. This time Ma Qi sent about 2,000 troops in the early summer of 1921 who thoroughly defeated and looted the Gong ma Tribe and its allies from other A skyong tribes such as the Khang gsar and the Dpon mo tshang. At the end of 1921, the troops returned to Xining with rich booty and several hundred hostages, including the mother of the Gong ma chieftain. Probably in 1922 Klu sdes/ Lude/ Lide (1903?-1933?/35?), the female chieftain of the Dpon mo tshang, was sent to Xining by her fellow Goloks to pay ransom for the release of the captured tribe members. It seems that many or even most of them remained in Labrang as hostages for two more years and that during this period, Klu sdes and Ma Lin, the brother of Warlord Ma Qi, established a close relationship. For instance, Klu sdes received the Chinese title Guoluo(he) nüwang, 'Golok Queen', which later led to many colorful reports by Western travelers. One source even claims that Ma Lin took Klu sdes as one of his wives. In fact, Klu sdes' tribe did not suffer from further attacks by the Ma troops during her leadership, instead, the Dpon mo tshang Tribe was ostracized by other Golok tribes.

38 Dpon mo tshang/ Hongmaocang, Nüwang buluo, 'Tribe of the Female Chieftain'. After the death of Klu sdes, the last female chieftain, her younger brother, Ralo Dorje (1915?-1967), succeeded her and the tribe was forthwith known as Ra lo tshang/ Ranluocang, 'Ralo's Tribe'.

39 One source claims that apart from thousands of sheep, yaks, and horses and tons of wool, as many as 500 Tibetan girls were taken from Golok by the soldiers (Anonymous 1921:492).

40 Klu sdes' mother, Gzi brjid sgrol ma/ Siji zhuoma (~1880 - ~1917), was appointed female leader of the Dpon mo tshang after Gzi brjid sgrol ma's father died without male heir. I am unaware of contemporary sources in which Gzi brjid sgrol ma was already referred to as a 'Golok Queen', but it is reported that the Dalai Lama and/or the Panchen Lama conferred a Tibetan official title on her (Yang 1995:37). She is also mentioned as a female chieftain in a late nineteenth century western source (Anonymous 1893:768). On these two female Golok chieftains see also Horlemann (2007:101-102).

41 Klu sdes is said to have periodically resided in Xining during or after these events. Rock reported that Klu sdes became the wife of Ma Qi instead of Ma Lin, but Rock probably confused the names of the Ma brothers (Qinghai san ma 1988:71, Yang 2006:131-132, Li and Li 1992:200-201, Rock 1956:123-124, and Rock, unpubl. manuscript A, 3).
Instructive for the study of Tibetan-Muslim relations are also the manifold interactions between the Tibetan Labrang Monastery and the family of the Ma warlords. Labrang was the most important Buddhist monastery in Northeastern Tibet besides, arguably, Kumbum Monastery/ Taersi. It was also a major trading center on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier, facilitated by its location near Linxia (formerly Hezhou), which was the main commercial and religious center of northwest China's Muslims.

Traditionally, in Amdo as elsewhere in Tibet, close trade relations were frequently formed by Tibetan monks and lamas on the one hand and Muslim as well as Chinese merchants on the other. Usually, a portion of donations by Buddhist pilgrims to monasteries, including livestock, salt, precious stones, and medicinal plants, was traded by the monasteries' treasurers through merchants to markets in Gansu and Sichuan. Monks also directly participated in business activities by renting out rooms to merchants for storage and by money lending. Thus, monks, regardless of rank, were regularly involved in trade transactions, some privately, others in the interest
of the monastery. Furthermore, the monasteries were convenient locations for trading activities of third parties during religious festivals and fairs.\textsuperscript{42}

In fact, Ma Qi’s father, Ma Haiyan, had such a business relationship and perhaps even friendship with the Fourth Jamyang Shaypa (1856-1916), the highest reincarnation of Labrang Monastery. In 1912, Ma Qi took advantage of this relationship by borrowing a substantial amount of silver from Li Zongzhe, the monastery treasurer, to bribe the governor of Gansu to bestow on him the official document of Ma’s promotion as military commander of Xining.\textsuperscript{43} In 1917-1918, Li Zongzhe, in turn, asked Ma Qi and the governor of Gansu to mediate in a Labrang internal dispute between Li Zongzhe and the regent of the late Fourth Jamyang Shaypa, the Third Balmang Tsang.\textsuperscript{44} This induced the Third Balmang Tsang to mobilize Tibetan troops to prevent the interference of the provincial government, which led to military confrontations with government

\textsuperscript{42} The late Thubten Jigme Norbu, an important reincarnate lama and the oldest brother of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, also entertained a close relationship with a Muslim merchant from Amdo (Thubten 1986:138, 141). With regard to money lending see Ekvall (1907:127).

\textsuperscript{43} Ma Qi borrowed 200 \textit{liang} of silver and several golden Buddha statues (\textit{Qinghai san ma} 1988:6-8, 28). For further indications of a friendly relationship between the Tibetan-speaking Ma Qi and the Fourth Jamyang Shaypa see Anonymous (1914:181).

\textsuperscript{44} According to one version, Li Zongzhe was anonymously accused of entertaining an illicit affair with the wife of a Mongol Prince who resided in Labrang. Li apparently blamed the Third Balmang Tsang for having circulated this slander (Nietupski 1999:84-85 and \textit{Qinghai san Ma} 1988:28-30). According to a somewhat different, but rather muddled report by the then Xining-based China Inland missionary, G Findlay Andrew, Li Zongzhe was the nephew of the late Fourth Jamyang Shaypa who had accumulated great wealth through donations (the so-called ‘silver mountain’ of the Fourth Jamyang Shaypa). After his death, Li Zongzhe apparently attempted to acquire some of these riches, which he regarded as his deceased uncle’s property. These attempts then ignited the anger of Labrang monks and led to Li’s flight to Xining (British Library, Oriental and India Office Collection, L/P&S/11/150, file P 1987/1919). Until around 1924, Li Zongzhe continued to meddle in Labrang affairs, apparently supported by Ma Qi and also the family of the late Fourth Jamyang Shaypa, and then retreated to Kumbum Monastery/Taersi where he lived with his brother Li Jinzhong (\textit{Qinghai san Ma} 1988:31-33, 68; \textit{Gansu sheng zhi} 2003:249-50; and Huang zhengqing \textit{yu wu shi jiamuyang} 1989:16-19).
troops under the command of Ma Qi and Ma Lin. In the end, the Ma troops were victorious and Ma Qi established a military garrison close to Labrang Monastery. He also intervened in order to have the Third Balmang Tsang substituted as regent by Gungthang Rinpoche.\footnote{45}

Due to the already existing amalgamation of personal relationships with political and economic interests, further serious conflicts arose in the 1920s between the Ma family and the Tibetan Alo Clan, the family of the Fifth Jamyang Shaypa (1916-1947). These were only settled in 1927 when the new Gansu provincial government intervened and permanently divested the Labrang area from the power sphere of the Ma Clan.\footnote{46} Despite great cruelty seen in military confrontations between Tibetans and the Muslim Ma warlords, including destruction of monasteries and mosques, it needs to be stressed that these were not religiously inspired 'holy' wars between Buddhism and Islam, but politically and economically motivated conflicts. In fact, the Ma Warlords did not hesitate to take severe measures against their Muslim co-religionists when they perceived their own dominant position endangered.\footnote{47}

\footnote{45} The Third Balmang Tsang belonged to the Amchog/ Amuquhu Tribe which, apparently, had come into conflict with Ma Qi already in 1915. The latter had sent a punitive expedition against this tribe after the Amchog Tribe had been accused of repeatedly attacking other tribes and trade caravans and had also refused to pay taxes (Qinghai san Ma 1988, 62-63). Consequently, the relationship between the Ma Clan and the Third Balmang Tsang was probably already rather tense before the Li Zongzhe affair unfolded in 1917. Later, in 1918 or 1919, Ma Qi sent another punitive expedition to the Amchog Tribe, massacring approximately 700 people and destroying and looting about thirty monasteries. After the Third Balmang Tsang’s death, his tribe surrendered and was later accused by their fellow Tibetans of treachery because they did not participate in a new armed conflict with Ma troops in 1925, but allegedly even robbed the other Tibetan tribes who were involved in the fighting (Qinghai san Ma 1988:28-30, 66-67; Gansu sheng zhi 2003:249; Huang zhengqing yu wu shi jiamuyang 1989:1; and Rock, unpl. manuscript B, 5).


\footnote{47} See, for example, the Hezhou/ Linxia conflicts in 1923 and in the 1930s (Linxia shizhi 1995:810 and Qinghai san ma 1988:76, 95).
Trade relations between Tibetans and Muslims took shape in transactions between Muslim merchants and members of the Buddhist clergy and in frequent interaction between neighboring Muslim and Tibetan farming communities, for example, when food supplies or household goods were bought and sold or certain services of artisanship were sought. Furthermore, itinerant Muslim merchants entertained a thriving barter trade with Tibetan nomads on the grassland, which was often based on longstanding 'guest-host relationships'. The Muslim traders as personal guests of a nomad's family, exchanged tea, cloth, and other goods of everyday necessity for such products as wool and hides. In Tibetan areas the 'guest-host relationship' implied such obligations as providing food and lodging, assisting in trade and other affairs of the guest, and being the guarantor for the guest's safety. These obligations were mutual, i.e., the guest would become the host when his former host came to visit.

Compared to local Chinese, the Muslims of Gansu and Qinghai were apparently more courageous and enterprising in terms of traveling under difficult conditions and under the permanent threat of bandit attacks and soon dominated the direct trade with the Tibetan nomads. In addition, the Muslims were generally more willing to adjust to Tibetan ways. They often spoke local Tibetan dialects, dressed in Tibetan style, and adopted Tibetan manners when traveling. Marriages between Tibetan women of the host family and Muslim guest merchants were common and often sealed and deepened the already existing friendships or trade relations between two families (Ekvall 1939:52-56, 62 and Andrew 1921?:30).

48 Itinerant traders of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century in Qinghai were also known as *yangke* 'itinerant sheep traders', presumably because they originally traded their merchandise for the sheep and goats (*yang*) of the Tibetans and the formerly economically and politically dominant Kokonor Mongols (see Cui 1999:388, *Hexi kaifa shi yanjiu* 1996:421, and Nayancheng 1853, *juan* 4, 7-9).

49 Also some nineteenth and early twentieth century western missionaries used the Chinese term *zhurenjia* to designate their Tibetan nomad host families (Ekvall 1907:143-144, Ekvall 1939:54-55, and Snyder 1905:136-137).
FIGURE 7. Scene from a border market in Gansu/ Qinghai in the 1930s. *Steyler Missionsbote* May 1939, 66:8, 199.

FIGURE 8. Traders in Tibetan clothing in Gansu/ Qinghai in the 1930s. Archivum Generale of the Societas Verbi Divini, Rome.

A similar but rather institutionalized form of trade with Tibetan nomads was the *xiejia* system that has received little attention from
western scholars.\footnote{Although the xiejia system in Amdo is occasionally mentioned in late nineteenth and early twentieth century western travelogues, the bulk of written material consists of Chinese sources such as gazetteers, official documents, and travelogues. Written Tibetan material has not yet come to my attention. See, for example, Nayancheng (1853, juan 4), Qing miao zong yi huangdi shilu (juan 21), Qing xuan zong cheng huangdi shilu (juan 42, 46, 50), Yang (1910:274, 287), Xu (1917:76-77), Hu and Huo (2006:22-26), Wang (1987:77-84), Ma and He (1994:26-29), Pu and Yi (1981:37-41), Huc and Gabet (1987:1, 386-387, II, 1, 18), and Tafel (1914/1:180-181, 184, 204-205).} During the Ming and Qing dynasties the owner of a xiejia, i.e., 'house of repose' or 'inn',\footnote{The term xiejia also designates 'owner of the hostel' and 'inn-keeper'. In this article I use xiejia only in the sense of 'hostel' or 'inn' and usually refer to the inn-keeper as 'the xiejia owner'. Furthermore, there were two categories of xiejia, the guan xiejia, i.e., the 'officially acknowledged' xiejia, and the si xiejia, i.e., the 'private' or 'illegal' xiejia. Xiejia are sometimes also called xiedian.} provided food and lodging for travelers and also had semi-official functions with regard to trade control, tax collection, and legal affairs. While the xiejia system was gradually abandoned in central China starting from the eighteenth century, it gained increasing importance in China’s northwest, especially Qinghai. The important border market Stong 'khor/ Dan'gaer\footnote{Modern Huangyuan is also spelled Stong skor in Tibetan. Western sources include Dankar, Tanko, Donkyr, and Tang-Keou-Eul.} on the Sino-Tibetan frontier, about fifty kilometers west of Xining, may serve as an example. The Stong 'khor xiejia were mostly run by Tibetan-speaking Muslims and several Han Chinese families who provided food and lodging to Tibetan nomads and to their usually numerous transport animals free of charge.\footnote{The xiejia system was also in place in Amdo for local Mongols and, for some time, the Monguor population. Han Chinese had their own inns that excluded Tibetans and Mongols.} In return, they asked for a certain percentage of the profits the nomads gained while trading their products at the local market with the assistance of the respective xiejia owners, who served as middlemen. Furthermore, the inn-keepers frequently offered other trade-related services, such as loans, storage of goods, and transportation to inner China. Most Tibetan tribes had specific xiejia at which they stayed each time when they came to border markets to trade. This often led to long-lasting trade relations and sometimes to close friendships or even to family
ties between the Tibetan customers and the xiejia owners. While in the early and mid-nineteenth century the Tibetan tribes had fixed xiejia at which they were obliged to stay, the system became more flexible in the late nineteenth century. For 1904 it is recorded that Tibetans in Stong 'khor chose from among a number of xiejia, however, they were still forbidden to stay at hostels for Chinese merchants and travelers (Tafel 1914/I:180).

First the Qing administration and later the warlords took advantage of this situation by taxing the xiejia and transferring certain duties to the hostel owners. For example, the xiejia owners were obliged to assist the Chinese border officials in controlling trade regulations and to serve as interpreters or mediators in conflicts with Tibetan tribes. During the international wool boom in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the xiejia owners also served as middlemen for the foreign wool trading companies.

Not surprisingly, when the middlemen served several masters simultaneously, conflicts of interest arose. Thus xiejia owners were frequently accused of exploiting the inexperience and naivety of their Tibetan customers, and even of outright fraud.54 However, Tibetan nomads also cleverly attempted to increase their profits, for example, by mixing sand into wool or drenching it with water to make it heavier. Although there is no hard data available on how the booming wool trade and the rapidly increasing wool prices affected the income of Tibetan nomads, there are indications that they also profited handsomely. One such indicator was the nomads' growing demand for and their improving supply of comparatively expensive firearms. While in the second half of the nineteenth century their weapons were usually described as poor and outdated, this changes markedly in the early twentieth century. It is also striking that the Amdo nomads of the early twentieth century were frequently described as

54 In fact, according to Chinese and foreign sources, the xiejia owners were ill-famed throughout most of their history. In western accounts, especially the Chinese and Muslim petty traders, the so-called diaolangzi (literally: cunning fox), who offered such daily-use articles as boots, knives, pots, and so on at various markets in Amdo, had the reputation of cheating their customers, specifically pastoralists, who were often unaware of ordinary market prices (Huc and Gabet 1987 II:17, Rijnhart 1901:134, and Haack 1940:12).
rich or well off and as having a higher social status than their sedentary compatriots. Apart from the nomads' weapons, the wealth and beauty of the nomad women's jewellery is repeatedly mentioned admiringly by western observers.\textsuperscript{55}

In sum, during most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the \textit{xiejia} institution played an important role in Muslim-Tibetan trade relations in major Sino-Tibetan border markets in Qinghai such as Stong 'khor where the bulk of the wool trade took place. It should also be noted that the \textit{xiejia} system in Amdo was not static, but its role developed and changed over time.\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure9}
\caption{Tibetan chief's daughter (center) in wedding dress with gold threads worth 3,000 Mexican dollars, 1934. Billy Graham Center Archives, Wheaton.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{55} See, for example, Filchner (1906:14 fn. 2), Andrew (1921?:30), Teichman (1922:77), Ekvall (1939:77-79, 81), Hermanns (1949:54-56, 223-224, 233), Xuan (2002:98), and Tafel (1914/I:286-287).

\textsuperscript{56} For a more detailed study on the \textit{xiejia} see Horlemann (2012).
FINAL REMARKS

By using these examples of the multi-dimensional relationships between Tibetans and Muslims on the Sino-Tibetan frontier, my intention has been to show that 'interethnic hatred' and religious differences alone are insufficient to explain Muslim-Tibetan conflicts. The case of the mid-nineteenth century Baoan Muslims demonstrates that land and irrigation rights can easily become contentious in farming communities. Existing interethnic problems can be further aggravated by measures taken by provincial and local administrations regarding military issues and by religious institutions that also wield economic power as landlords. In contrast, the Ma warlords attempted to pursue their political and economic goals against a largely opposing population of whom a major part were Tibetans. Their main motivation was therefore not 'interethnic hatred' or a war of religions, but the Ma Clan's personal economic and political interests. Close trade relations between Tibetans and Muslims, however, provide evidence of how mutual economic interests overcame ethnic barriers and even resulted in Muslim-Tibetan marriages. Therefore, studies on the past and present relations between Tibetans and Muslims call for a closer examination of socio-economic and political factors while bearing in mind the great complexity and the many local differences in Tibetan and Muslim communities.

This paper has highlighted only a few aspects that shaped Muslim-Tibetan relations in the past by providing three very different examples. Left unexplored are many other possible causes for conflict that deserve further study, such as the impact of waves of immigration of Han Chinese and Hui from neighboring provinces in the aftermath of famines, natural catastrophes, and conflicts, and how this increasing population pressure in certain areas in Gansu and Qinghai influenced interethnic relations. The 'Muslim revolts' of the nineteenth century, for instance, led to an increased influx of Chinese Muslims from Shaanxi and other provinces into Gansu and Qinghai through forced resettlements.\textsuperscript{57} The role of religious institutions as political and economic players also needs more extensive research.

---

\textsuperscript{57} With regard to migration waves of Han Chinese from Hunan, Shaanxi, and Shanxi into the Linxia area during the Qing Dynasty and the Republican era
REFERENCES


Chen Bingyuan 陈秉渊. 2007. Ma Bufang jiazu tongzhi Qinghai sishinian 马步芳家族统治青海四十年 [The Forty Years of Rule of Ma Bufang's Family Over Qinghai]. Xining 西宁: Qinghai renmin chubanshe 青海人民出版社 [Qinghai People's Press].


Don grub dbang rgyal 1991. Mgo log lo rgyus deb ther [Mgo log Historical Records] in Mgo log rig gnas lo rgyus [History of Golok Culture]. vol 1, np, Srid gros Mgo log rig gnul u rig gnas lo rgyu cha zhib 'jug u yon Itan khang 希尔格乌里格纳尔贡克江 [Mgo log Cultural and Historical Materials Committee ], 1-178.


Fischer, A. 2008a. The Muslim Cook, the Tibetan Client, His Lama and Their Boycott: Modern Religious Discourses of Anti-Muslim Economic Activism in Amdo in F Pirie and T Huber (eds) *Conflict and Social Order in Tibet and Inner Asia*. Leiden: Brill, 159-192.


Gu lог dam chos dpal bzang [A History of the Goloks - Like Incense from Nyanpo Yurtse], vol. 1, Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.


Tibetans and Muslims in Northwest China


Xu Ke 徐珂. 1917 [1983]. Qing bai lei chao 清稗类钞 [Unofficial Collection of Qing Dynasty Miscellanea]. Taipei 台北: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 台湾商务印书馆 [Taiwan Commercial Press], vol. 5, Nong shang lei 农商类 [References to Agriculture and Commerce].


Yang Hongwei 杨红伟. 2009. Wan qing xunhua ting suoxia zangqu de buluo chongtu yu yanjin [Tribal Conflicts and Their Evolution in Tibetan Areas under the Jurisdiction of Xunhua Ting during the Late Qing]. *Zhongguo xizang* 中国西藏 [China’s Tibet] 4:24-30.


NON-ENGLISH TERMS

A
A skyong gong ma 阿什贡麻, A shen jiang gong ma 阿什僧江贡麻
Alo, A blo 阿洛
Amchog, A mchog 阿木措, Amuquhu 阿木曲乎
Amdo, A mdo 阿坝
Amnye Machen, A myes rma chen 阿尼玛切
awangcang 阿旺仓
axiang 阿香

B
Balmang Tsang, Dbal mang tshang 阿坝塘
Amangcang 阿莽仓
Baoan 保安
Bayankala 巴颜喀拉
Bayanrong, Ba yan rong 巴彦荣, Hualong 化隆
Bod hu'i 僧武, E hui 哇回

C
cao tou shui 草头税

D
Dan'gaer 丹噶尔, Stong 'khor 那曲
Dgu rong 都隆
diaolangzi 尕郎子
ding yin 丁银
dmags shed can mA rgyud 红毛仓
Dpon mo tshang 赤毛仓, Hongmaocang 红毛仓/Nüwang buluo 女王部落
Dongxiang 东乡
Duosaidong 朵赛东, Duozedong 朵泽东

G
Ganhetan 千河滩
Gannan 甘南
Gansu 甘肃
Gedimu 格底目
Gling rgyal 邻热, Langjia 郎加
Golok, mgo log 果洛, Guoluo 果洛/Guoluode 果洛和
guan xiejia 官歇家
Guide 黄德, Khri ka གླུ་ཁོ་
Gungthang Rinpoche, Gung thang rin po che གུང་ཐང་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
Guoluo(he) niwang 果洛(和)女王
Gzi brjid sgrol ma གླེ་བྲྭིད་སྒྲོལ་མ།, Siji zhuoma 斯吉卓玛

Han 汉
Helsonaka 合隆那卡
Hezhou 河州
hua'er 花儿
Hualong 化隆
Hualong Huizu zizhixian 化隆回族自治县
Huanghe 黄河
Huangnan Zangzu zizhizhou 黄南藏族自治州
Huangyuan 湟源
Hui 回
Huzhu Tu 互助土
Huzhu Tuzu zizhixian 互助土族自治县

Jamyang Shaypa, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ཁམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པ།
Jekundo, Skye dgu mdo གཟི་དུ་མོ་, Yushu 玉树
Jishishan 积石山
Jishishan Baoan Dongxiang Salazu zizhixian 积石山保安东乡撒拉族自治县

Khang gsar སྒང་གིར།
Klu sdes མདུས་, Lude 鲁德/ Lide 李德
Kokonor, Mtsho sngon po བོ་མཚོ་གསོན་པོ་, Qinghaihu 青海湖
Kumbum, Sku 'bum byams pa gling སྲུ་བོམ་བྱམས་པ་གྲིང་, Taersi 塔尔寺
Labrang, Bla brang bkra shis 'khyil བླ་བོང་མེ་འི་, Labulengsi 拉卜楞寺
lama, bla ma བླ་མ།
Lanzhou 兰州
laojiao 老教/ Khufiyya
Li Jinzhong 李金钟
Tibetans and Muslims in Northwest China

Li Zongzhe 李宗哲
Linxia 临夏
Lu Hongtao 陆洪涛

M
Ma Anliang 马安良
Ma Bufang 马步芳, MA pu'u h+phang རབ་ཕུང་།
Ma Fuxiang 马福祥
Ma Haiyan 马海宴
Ma Hongkui 马鸿逵
Ma Laichi 马来迟
Ma Lin 马麟, MA len རླུན།
Ma Mingxin 马明心
Ma Qi 马麒, MA chi ཕྭི།/ chis བི།
Ma Shou 马寿
Ma Wanfu 马万福/ Ma Guoyuan 马果园
Ma Zhan'ao 马占鳌
Maba 麻巴
Meipo 梅坡
Menggu 蒙古
menhuan 门宦
Minhe Huizu Tuzu zizhixian 民和回族土族自治县
Minhe Tu 民和土

N
Ningxia 宁夏

Q
Qing 清
Qinghai 青海

R
Ra lo tshang ར་ལོ་ཚང་།, Ranluocang 然洛仓
Ralo Dorje, Ra lo rdo rje ར་ལོ་རྡོ་རྨ་, Ranluo Duoji 然洛多吉
Reb gong རེབ་གོང་།, Tongren 同仁
rinpoche, rin po che རིན་པོ་ཆེ།

184
Rma chu 黃河
Rnying ma pa 漢
Rong bo 萘

Salar, Sala 撒拉
Shaanxi 陝西
Shabkar, Zhabz dkar tshogs drug rang grol 甲昭巴·次多群格拉
Shanxi 山西

Si xiejia 私歇家
Sichuan 四川

Skye dgu mdo 脫，玉樹
Stong 'khor 仲巴
Dan'gaer 丹噶尔

Taozhou 滏州
Tongren Tu 同仁土
Tusi 土司
Tuyuhun 吐谷渾

 ula(g), wula 乌拉
 wula 乌拉

yangke 羊客

Xianfeng 咸丰
xiedian 歇点
xiejia 歇家
xinjiao 新教/ Jahriyya
Xining 西寧
Xinjiang 新疆
xinxinjiao 新新教/ yihewani 伊赫瓦尼/ Ikhwan
Xunhua 循化
Xunhua Salazu zizhixian 循化撒拉族自治县
Xunhua ting 循化厅

Yugur, Yugu 裕固
Yul shül 玉树, Yushu 玉树
Yunnan 云南

Zhabs dkar tshogs drug rang grol 佐巴赤脚多杰绛觉 zhurenjia 主人家